30 ChaPter 4: What is Privacy? a Normative account Law Commission Miscellaneous Paper languages of expression�f.⁹⁵ taylor acknowledged that, �eWe are of course expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances towards things, and to a considerable degree through solitary reflection [emphasis added]�f.⁹⁶ having privacy can assist this process of developing life plans or projects. 77. autonomy and equality are certainly linked in spite of both the practical and imagined tensions between them in some accounts: to value autonomy is to respect the conceptions that others have of themselves and their life plans or projects. the political and normative position of humans as having equal dignity is premised upon the idea that all humans have an entitlement to equal respect. Whether we are strangers or intimates, each and everyone of us is worthy of such respect. the potential of humans, �erather than anything a person may have made of it, is what ensures that each person deserves respect�f.⁹⁷ a t a high level of abstraction, the concept of democracy, as understood in elements of contemporary theory, also tends to operate with the notion of moral equality in the context of political action: �ebecause each individual life is an end in itself, collective decisions ought to recognize, respect, and benefit individuals�f interests and values equally, insofar as possible�f.⁹⁸ 78. there are undoubted tensions (perceived and real) in liberal political thought. samuel scheffler has warned that �eassociative duties�f, which he has described as �eduties that the members of significant social groups and the participants in close personal relationships are often thought to have toward one another�f, represent a potential tension point in liberal thought for both autonomy and equality values.⁹⁹ scheffler counsels that �emost of us�c believe that our family relations and social affiliations can be a source of responsibilities that do not derive solely from choices we have made�f.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, he believes that there is the �epotential for genuine conflict in our thinking about the extent of our responsibilities to different individuals and groups�f.¹⁰¹ 79. yael tamir has commented that �eassociative duties�f are not �egrounded in the idea that what is mine is more valuable than what is yours�f.¹⁰² hence, �e[w]hen i claim that charity begins at home i do not intend to imply that the poor of my town are better but merely that�c I have a greater obligation toward them than to strangers because they are members of my community�c [such] claims do not�c imply an objective hierarchy among different forms of life [emphasis in original]�f.¹⁰³ scheffler is right to say that, while not all liberals necessarily accept the existence of 95 charles taylor, �ethe politics of recognition�f in amy Gutman (ed), Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition (Princeton u  niversity Press, Princeton, 1994) 96 i bid. 97 i bid, 41. 98 Mark e Warren, �eDemocracy and the state�f, in John s Dryzek, Bonnie h  onig and a nne Phillips (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford u niversity Press: Oxford, 2006) 99 s amuel s cheffler, �e ntroduction�finhis Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of justice and responsibility in liberal thought (Oxford university Press, New york, 2001), 4-5. By way of comparison, refer to Michael sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (cambridge university Press, cambridge, 1982), 179; Neil Maccormick, �eNation and Nationalism�f, in his Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in legal and social philosophy ( c larendon Press, Oxford, 1982), 247-264. 100  i bid, 5. 101  i bid. 102  y ael amir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton u niversity Press, Princeton, 103  i bid, 100-101.