CHAPTER 2: Parliamentary law-making in New Zealand
governing party (or parties) vote together as a unified bloc in favour of
the government. Members of support parties do likewise in accordance with the
terms of their confidence and supply agreements. p
arty discipline is low in
presidential systems, in the United States for instance, primarily because the
executive does not need the confidence of the legislature to take and retain office.
t
his authority comes directly from the electorate, usually for a
Not only does party discipline allow governments to hold office, it is also the
2.17
mechanism by which governments ensure that the House approves their annual
appropriations (the eBudgetf) to allow government departments and agencies to
carry out their various functions. p
arty discipline also facilitates the enactment
of government legislation by predisposing a majority of the House to vote in
favour of government Bills as they pass through the House. o
nly once in recent
decades has a government suffered the outright defeat of one of its Bills.30 From
a governance perspective this is beneficial. It allows governments to implement
their chosen polices, while providing the necessary statutory mechanisms for
the exercise of good government.
party discipline empowers the electorate. parties can appeal to voters on the
2.18
basis that the governing party (or parties) will be able to implement their election
policies because a majority of the House will support the governmentfs
initiatives.31 Conversely, where party discipline is lacking, and the successful
enactment of government measures depends on temporary ad hoc alliances of
sufficient numbers of individual M
is denied a meaningful choice between alternative governments offering
competing sets of policies. e
xplicit policy pledges are less effectual if the resulting
government lacks the means to achieve them.
p
arty discipline also promotes political accountability to the electorate. A clear
2.19
demarcation of responsibility for policy is achieved through party-based voting.
When legislation is visibly the responsibility of a government, pushed through
the House by its disciplined majority, voters can rebuke or reward the government
depending on how the polices implemented by the legislation are viewed by the
electorate (or at least the majority of it).
In the absence of party discipline, accountability to the electorate for legislative
2.20
decisions diminishes significantly. Government measures succeed only because
a sufficient number of individual Mps each with their own motivations and
justifications align themselves in favour of the proposal. In this sense the
decision to enact a Bill is a collective choice of the individual M
the House rather than the governing party (or parties) acting as a cohesive unit.
Consequently, responsibility for legislation is diffused across the chamber, meaning
that voters are less able to punish or reward those responsible for enactment since
it may not be clear precisely who this was in any given instanc
30
Local Government Amendment Bill (No. 5) ((1998) 567 NZ
p
D 8195).
o
f course, if a government is
uncertain as to the level of parliamentary support for a Bill it is likely to delay the Bill until sufficient
support can be garnered, or alternatively, allow the Bill to l
31
Jackson, above n 23, 44.
10
Law Commission Report
