57 legislation and unless a substantial number of Law Commission projects result in legislation, the Law Commission may not achieve its statutory purposes.    228.  The  legislative  programme  of  the  Government  is  directly  controlled  by  the Government.  The Cabinet Legislation Committee and the Minister of Justice are important actors in determining the legislative programme; the Law Commission is not.  But unless the Government gives priority to Law Commission projects or wishes to enact its recommendations, it is unlikely anything will occur.  There have been some instances of Law Commission Reports being taken up by private Members  of  Parliament  and  introduced  into  the  legislative  process  that  way⁵¹, but  this  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  a  satisfactory  solution  to  the  problem  of enactment of Law Commission Reports.    229.  There  is  also  a  certain  tension  between  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  Law Commission.  That has been there since the beginning and, in many ways, it is a healthy tension.  There is an element of contestability about the work of the two agencies.    Both  engage  in  law  reform.    Both  have  ambitions  in  that  direction.   The  question  of  which  is  the  appropriate  agency  to  carry  out  the  work  is sometimes not an easy question to resolve.    230.  But  there  is  a  reason  why  the  Law  Commission  is  not  part  of  the  Executive Government in the classical sense.  If it were not independent, it would not have the standing that it needs to secure support for its proposals.  Neither would it be able to stand up to the Government when on occasion that may be necessary to safeguard  the  values  that  it  is  statutorily  obliged  to  advance.    Further,  there would be problems in recruiting Commissioners of sufficient standing in the law. 231.  The  constitutional  dilemma  between  independence  and  effectiveness  is  a question of balance in the end.  The Commission should not become part of the Executive arm of Government but it does need to show sensitivity to the legislative aims of the Government of the day and to help fashion proposals that the Government is interested in advancing.                                                    51   For example, a Private Member’s Bill is  curr ently on the Order Paper in response to NZLC R44 Habeas Corpus: Procedure (1997), and the Arbitration Act 1996 recommended by NZLC R20 Arbitration (1991) was the result of a Private Member’s Bill.