accountability   of   the   executive   government,   financial   budgeting   and   authorisations   in addition to law-making.  Yet there is resistance to the delegation of the legislative function on the basis that it is not appropriate for matters of significant policy content. In  its  law-making  role  the  modern  legislature  must  depend  for  efficiency  upon  agencies internal and external of government in the identification of needs, research, consultation and drafting.    In  each  of  these  areas,  it  is  the  nature  of  government  that  matters  having  higher public  profile  or  pressure  will  have  preference.    Even  well-researched,  relatively  non- controversial proposals from our Law Commission can wait years before being taken into the legislative programme.    I believe that the lack of room in legislative programmes increasingly is spawning attempts to get satisfaction from the courts in areas many would say are more appropriate for decisions of government. The expressed anxiety towards judges making or changing the law has been matched by, and may be linked to, the increasing frequency with which broad and open language is employed in  legislation.    Perhaps  this  reflects  time  pressures  on  the  government  and  Parliament.   Perhaps it reflects compromises in the political processes.  In some cases it results from the incorporation  of  international  instruments,  necessarily  drafted  in  general  terms  to  attract acceptance.    The  courts  must  not  only  resolve  major  issues  of  interpretation  but  must  also determine the impact of the broadly stated rights and obligations on the common law and on administrative decision-making.³   Perhaps the most graphic example in this country of open language legislation was s9 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986.  As part of the corporatising of government departments the Act established certain state-owned enterprises.  Section 9 provided that nothing in the Act should permit the Crown to act in a manner that was inconsistent with the principles of the  Treaty  of  Waitangi.    That  was  the  treaty  signed  between  the  British  Crown  and representatives of Maori tribes in 1840 by which New Zealand became a British colony.  The Treaty had not hitherto been treated as part of the domestic law of New Zealand and nowhere were its principles defined.  The courts were required to determine whether the vesting by the 3 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257