5 Yet another is to promote the settlement of land claims.  And in addition, another goal is to combine elements of both cultures to forge a common national identity.  The present Coat of Arms is a classic, symbolic example, especially when compared with its predecessors.  An example of a focused plan of action from the private sector is the programme to develop a bicultural jurisprudence undertaken at Waikato University. These are laudatory objectives but the law is more fundamentally concerned with the rights of Maori as an indigenous people.  Accordingly, of the bicultural objectives I have mentioned, the law is probably concerned mainly with the recognition of Maori governance institutions, land rights and custom law.    Multiculturalism has two aspects in New Zealand.  One aspect concerns the toleration of cultural difference.  The other concerns the celebration of cultural difference.  The latter overlaps with bicultural policy development and can lead to competition for government support but more often I should think, the two policies are mutually supportive.  However, the law is concerned only with the first aspect, the toleration of cultural difference.  In New Zealand, this is normally in the context of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights Act.   However, for the more complete and effective management of diversity I suggest it is more helpful to fall back on the tried and trusty rule of law.  I have suggested that it is fundamentally about the relationship that exists between the state and its subjects.   The only problem is that the subjects of Dicey’s state were one people.  The state of the global age is more likely to have to deal with peoples.    Accordingly, where Dicey spoke of individual liberties or civil rights, we have now to talk as well, of group rights.  I suggest that the predominant issue now, for world and national peace and good order, is the appropriate accommodation of different interest groups within the life of the state.   You will note then that the Courts have been grasping the nettle for some long time.   Just as Dicey thought should be the case the Courts have not waited for constitutional direction or direction from the assembly of states in international instruments.  The have been making constitutional provisions for years.  It is important to observe, that