provisions  of  the  Constitution  and  to  devise,  fund,  implement  and  supervise measures to provide relief to those in desperate need.   28 For  myself  I  cannot  see  that  such  judicial  encroachment  into  key  government activity can be acceptable in New Zealand’s political culture and it runs contrary to our traditions. Nor do I believe our judges have the background or capacities to make  that  sort  of  decision.    It  is  best  left  to  politics.    In  South  Africa  the constitutional  court  administers  a  constitution  born  out  of  circumstances  quite different from New Zealand’s. For me the South African arrangements translated to New Zealand do raise the spectre of Professor Smillie’s “juristocracy.” 29 It is not my view and never has been that the Judges should be let loose on the broader aspects of social policy to alter in significant ways fiscal policy, taxation policy, education, heath, social welfare policy or any of the other broader political issues  that  constitute  the  stuff  of  politics  in  New  Zealand.  My  aim  has  always been more limited - limited to those issues relating to civil and political rights that lie at the bedrock of our democratic system, where the common law judges have traditional expertise in our legal culture.  Having dealt with the options that lie at the two extremes of the continuum, now I put forward a third. 30 An  extension  of  the  judges’  powers  can  be  considered  within  the  defined  areas contained in the Bill of Rights Act.  They could be given the power to invalidate legislation.    Section  4  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  would  have  to  be  repealed.    The experience New Zealand has had with the Bill of Rights over the past fifteen years does  not  indicate  to  me  that  the  net  impact  of  such  an  extension  would  be dramatic.  Indeed,  in  broad  terms,  I  suggest  it  would  have  less  impact  on  the Executive  Government  and  Parliament  than  the  growth  of  judicial  review  of administrative action. Since the passage of the Judicature Amendment Act in 1972 this growth has been dramatic.  Yet these significant increases in judicial power do  not  appear  to  have  been  resented  by  the  Executive,  the  Parliament  or  the citizenry.    No  serious  effort  has  been  made  to  curb  the  growth  of  modern administrative  law.  Neither  has  it  hampered  the  capacity  of  the  Executive  and Parliament  to  carry  out  their  functions.    Justice  in  an  individual  case  is  not  the same thing as social justice for the community as a whole.     11