26 Attorney -Ge nera l  v  New   Zealand   Ma ori  Coun cil  [1991]   2  N ZLR   129 ;  Attorney-General  v  New Zealand  Ma ori Coun cil (No  2) [1999] 2 NZLR 147. 15 incompatibility. The legislative branch of government has raised the bar by giving statutory recognition to civil and political rights developed both by the common law and international law. 23 Professor  Mark  Tushnet’s  paper  provides  a  context  for  consideration  of  the significance of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. To use Professor Tushnet’s classification, it is “weak-form judicial  review”.  However, it is no less effective for that  as  a  means  of  securing  in  legislation  adherence  to  basic  human  rights  and constitutional values. 24 The reasons for this relate to the in-built sanction of section 7 reports drawing the attention  of  legislators  to  the  possibility  that  they  may,  by  enacting  a  statute, expressly override a protected right or freedom with the political costs involved in taking  such  a  step,  the  careful  scrutiny  that  Bills  receive  for  Bill  of  Rights compliance, the opportunity for consideration of Bill of Rights issues during the parliamentary process, the scope for more complete consideration of issues resulting from release of Bill of Rights advice to the Government, and the degree to which the legislature is prepared to accept court decisions in Bill of Rights cases. What these considerations  suggest,  adopting  Professor  Tushnet’s  analysis,  is  that  the  New Zealand weak-form judicial review transforms into a strong form. Common law principles, the Treaty, international law, and other statutes 25 Other conventions and institutional arrangements operate to promote accessible legislation.  It  is  an  established  common  law  principle  that  Parliament  does  not intend to legislate in a manner inconsistent with the Treaty of Waitangi.²⁶ As the LAC Guidelines note, the Treaty has been described as “part of the  fabric of New