passage of the Bill. In 2003, Parliament passed 45 Acts which ran to a total of over
4,000 pages. There were also 3,354 Statutory Instruments, running to 11,977 pages.
There is a perceived need to take stock of this by providing a mechanism that will
enable Parliament to look back and review the effects of legislation once it has
been implemented. We do not suggest that review of this kind would have any
impact at all in stemming the flow or volume of legislation, rather that the fact of
the flow necessitates looking back to see what lessons may be learnt. Post-
legislative scrutiny should translate into better regulation. If there is to be public
commitment to better regulation, an obvious part of that is the examination of
legislation once it has been brought into force; it may be that wider lessons can
then be learnt on the method of regulation and the necessity for legislation.
94
There seems to be a lot of support for the concept of post-legislative scrutiny in
the United Kingdom. The difficulty with it is to provide an effective set of
intellectual tests as to what it comprises and how it can be delivered. The first
issue is whether Parliament itself should engage in this activity. In New Zealand,
Select Committees can conduct inquiries on a very wide range of matters. But
Parliament is busy, and there are resource restraints.
95
Furthermore, there are many different types of legislation. A one size fits all
concept would not be workable, as the English Law Commissions paper makes
clear. Indeed, the paper makes it clear that post-legislative scrutiny could be
governmental, Parliamentary, or external. Or it might involve all three. The
English Law Commission charts two avenues by which the goal may be achieved.
The first is a pre-planned post-legislative scrutiny for which a positive
commitment to review is made in advance of the enactment.42
96
In New Zealand it would always be possible to put within a statutory provision the
requirement for a review of the statute to be tabled in Parliament within a
specified time period, after it has been in operation.
97
The second avenue proposed by the Law Commission contemplates post-
legislative scrutiny for which there was no prior commitment and therefore relies
on post-enactment triggers for review. The process could be started by the
Executive Government, a Select Committee, or indeed, possibly by external
agencies like the Law Commission.
42
Law Commission (consultation paper no 178) above n 36, 35.
29