been incorporated in a broad and generous way and so protect Maori interests, but it  is  far  from  clear  that  the  courts  would  have  done  so  without  legislation.  The courts can hardly be criticized for the stance they have taken, given the purpose the  Treaty  had  in  the  first  place.  Yet  Treaty  jurisprudence  and  Bill  of  Rights jurisprudence have both given rise to the impression held in some quarters than the courts are ‘activist” and involved in some political and ideological frolic of their own in deciding cases, a view I reject.   14 Reference to the Treaty may well be part of orthodox legal theory in New Zealand for  the  purposes  of  statutory  interpretation.  Justice  Chilwell  in  a  case  in  1987 said:⁶ “There can be no doubt that the Treaty is part of the fabric of New Zealand society. It follows that it is part of the context in which legislation which impinges upon its principles is to be interpreted when it is proper, in accordance with the principles of statutory interpretation to have resort to extrinsic material.”   15 The  Treaty  of  Waitangi  Act  1975  established  the  Waitangi  Tribunal  to  hear grievances  about  alleged  breaches  of  the  Treaty  by  the  government  and  make recommendations about them.  The chair of the Tribunal is the Chief Judge of the Maori  Land  Court.  In  1985  the  Tribunal’s  jurisdiction  was  extended  by  statute back  to  1840,  the  date  the  Treaty  was  entered  into.  As  a  result  any  Maori  may claim that he or she (or a group to which he or she belongs) has been prejudicially affected by any legislation, regulation, policy or practice, or act of the Crown                                                   6    Huakina  Development  Trust  v  Waikato  Valley  Authority  [1987]  2  NZLR  188.    See  also Barton-Prescott v Director-General of Social Welfare [1997] 3 NZLR 179, 184:  “We are of the view that since the Treaty of Waitangi was designed to have general application, that general  application  must  colour  all  matters  to  which  it  has  relevance,  whether  public  or private and that for the purposes of interpretation of statutes, it will have a direct bearing whether or not there is a reference to the treaty in the statute.  We also take the view that the familial organisation of one of the peoples a party to the treaty, must be seen as one of the taonga, the preservation of which is contemplated.  Accordingly we take the view that all Acts dealing with the status, future and control of children, are to be integrated as coloured by the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.  Family organisation may be said to be included among those things which the treaty was intended to preserve and protect.   … Since we are satisfied that the wording of the Acts with relevance to this proceeding is such that there is no conflict with treaty principles, indeed there are a number of provisions which directly incorporate those principles and there is certainly nothing contrary to that in the Guardianship Act itself, we are not therefore confronted with and do not comment on the situation which might arise where a statutory provision was seen to be in conflict with the Treaty of Waitangi or related principles”.